Where do we go from here?
Ukraine cannot sustain its fight against Russia. There is not enough support for the war effort domestically — or internationally; trust in Mr. Zelensky has fallen ‘from 80% in May 2023 to 45% this year’ and, ‘fewer than 30% of Ukrainians consider draft-dodging shameful’. Such metrics associated with patriotism and popularity of the Prime Minister are set to further deteriorate this winter as Ukrainians brace themselves for long electricity and heating blackouts as Russia destroyed much of the power grid over the summer. Despite Mr. Zelensky’s steadfast commitment to restoring Ukraine’s borders to the state in which they were created in 1991, the military has made almost no progress towards this goal since its first counteroffensive in 2022 yet roughly half a million soldiers have been killed, 8 million people have left the country and 7 million have been internally displaced. I bore witness to this fuzz firsthand when my brother and I traversed across no man’s land on the Ukraine-Poland border for the first time in June 2022. The imagery was clear. The line to the Polish border control checkpoint trailed back kilometers — the line for the Ukrainian one, well, it didn’t exist. The civilian devastation was clear as we helped manage the Siobhan’s Trust’s daily strategic operation of delivering pizzas to internally displaced people centers, orphanages and military recovery centers. These failures should be considered in the context of $174bn in support from the US, not to mention support from its 54 other benefactors. Barring a successful Russian Blitzkrieg in February of 2022, or an all out nuclear war it’s difficult to imagine how this war could possibly have gone much worse for the Ukrainians. Yes, many Russians have been killed or injured in the war and there have been valiant efforts to defy Mr. Putin’s aggressive actions, notably in the Black Sea where Ukraine has done significant damage to the Russian Navy, but that does not change the nature of the situation at home. As for the state of the economy total revenues are barely projected to cover half of its spending in 2025. Mr. Zelensky told the UN last week that Ukraine needed more sanctions as well as more, huge long range missiles. A brief glance at the country’s budget would suggest it needs a whole lot more than that to keep the war going.
Such a dire situation at home is set against an opponent which seems to have settled into a steady pace with regard to its economy and military production. Russia’s economy has adapted: Key industries have found ways to get the goods and components they need from alternative suppliers, and the state’s rainy day fund stood at 12 trillion rubles, $130 billion, at the start of 2024. Iran and China are partly responsible for such a restructuring in the economy since the state was clobbered with sanctions from the West in 2022 — which froze hundreds of billions of dollars of Russian assets. The Kremlin, whose intentions seem aligned around maintaining a sense of normalcy domestically and sustaining the military on the front line, intends to wait out the west perceiving weakness in its will. It’s working. The state is now producing over 100 cruise and ballistic missiles and 300 attack drones per month. Furthermore, the population differential, significantly favoring Russia offers a particularly advantageous position given the high turnover of soldiers since 2022. Support from America, Ukraine’s most powerful ally, is waning. The most colorful embodiment of this is JD Vance’s recent suggestion that he ‘doesn’t really care’ what happens in Ukraine. An implementation of such ambivalent American support in January would surely spell disaster for Mr. Zelensky.
While this analysis of the conflict would point towards all-out Ukrainian defeat — the West won’t let that happen despite Mr. Vance’s ambivalent attitude. As for a peace-agreement, a stale ceasefire is far more likely. The reality, as articulated by Tanesha Fazal, is that ‘peace treaties have gone out of fashion no matter the circumstances of war’. 75% of 19th century interstate wars ended with peace treaties, while since 1950 a mere 15% have ended through a treaty. Given the shocking odds of how the war is likely to end it’s America’s responsibility to drag Ukraine to that point as quickly as possible in order to minimize the risk of nuclear escalation and the loss of lives. ‘Zelensky’s mantra of no negotiation, no compromise’ must be dropped, quick. President Trump is right; the fighting must stop and ironically it may take a strongman in the White House to subdue the strong man in the Kremlin. I don’t however, suppose that Mr. Trump would love my proposal as to how to address the conflict going forward though.
In order to put an end to this scrappy fight America must remember what’s at stake: Ukraine’s potential of becoming a prosperous, Western-leaning democracy as it was on the path to do — not territory. Therefore from the perspective of supporting Ukraine domestically America should ensure the state’s leader not only understands this but is able to rally support around this ideal. Without an understanding of this any subsequent support strategy is rendered futile from an American perspective. The success of this element of policy however, is somewhat out of America’s control and may threaten the US’s attempt to create stability in the region. Mr. Johnson’s war efforts in Vietnam for example, were enormously obstructed by the 16 changes of government and 13 changes of prime minister in Saigon following Mr. Diem’s assassination under Mr. Kennedy. Let this be a lesson for Ukraine.
US policy must draw a red-line from an arms-length distance. An induction of Ukraine into NATO makes this possible. Article V should be applied to a parallel somewhere absent of current fighting ensuring that the message baked into the policy, relays to Russia the idea that any further advance would be seen as a direct attack on 32 democracies and met with a severe retaliation. This is not a war that the US wants to take full responsibility of the outcome for and therefore NATO provides an outstanding ability for the US to wield policy while being able to fall back on 31 other countries for support itself. Of course, NATO must be whipped into shape and spending brought in line across all participants but this is a menial task compared to the one at hand. This option provides an enforceable red-line which would create credibility that Ukraine has never before experienced, a sense of security that reduces the possibility — highlighted by The Economist — that Mr. Putin may radicalize battle-hardened militias agains the West and NATO if Ukrainians are left in the cold and, would bring a halt to the fighting when Mr. Putin realizes that he’s probably better off to walk away with what he’s already secured. He may be a strongman but he’s not a madman.
With regard to the potential risks of inflaming tensions in Ukraine with this policy I would argue that the realist view of the alteration of the balance of power has already been ‘priced-in’ by Russia as a result of Ukraine being named ‘a NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partner’ in 2020. What a silly decision that was — poke the Kremlin but don’t set any standard for protection. Ukraine has paid the price over the last 3 years. This proposal addresses that grave error in full.
The policy proposed creates long-term commitment to Ukraine but not from the US alone. The induction of Ukraine into NATO ensures that there will neither be Americanization nor Russia-ization of the state. The US won’t have to worry about the erosion of deterrence and its reputation with regard to China. Furthermore, the US can turn its focus to China without the the risks associated with Europe potentially being unable to defend its eastern flank. From my perspective the utilization of NATO as an instrument of US foreign policy in Ukraine is the epitome of an America First Platform. Mr. Trump has suggested that the fighting will stop on his first day as President Elect. We’re not quite sure however, how he would bring about such a result. I do hope he’s right. Perhaps he had my proposal in mind all along.
Notes
“Fact Sheet: One Year of Supporting Ukraine.” The White House, February 21, 2023. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/02/21/fact-sheet-one-year-of-supporting-ukraine/#:~:text=Democracy%2C%20Human%20Rights%2C%20and%20Anti,(EDRI)%20in%20March%202022.
Foy, Henry, and Polina Ivanova. 2024. “Why Zelenskyy Says His Victory Plan Is the Only Way to Stop Russia.” Financial Times, October 18, 2024. https://www.ft.com/content/a4951188-a49d-4609-9db7-7e0b671f0de0.
Holder, Josh, Lauren Leatherby, Anton Troianovski, and Weiyi Cai. “The West Tried to Isolate Russia. It Didn’t Work.” The New York Times, February 23, 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/02/23/world/russia-ukraine-geopolitics.html.
“In Race to Arm Ukraine, U.S. Faces Cracks in Its Manufacturing Might.” The Washington Post, March 10, 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/03/08/us-weapons-manufacturing-ukraine/.
“Issues in Negotiations: Looking toward an End to the War in Ukraine.” n.d. Hoover Institution. Accessed October 22, 2024. https://www.hoover.org/research/issues-negotiations-looking-toward-end-war-ukraine.
Kullab, Samya. 2024. “After 2 Years of War, Questions Abound on Whether Kyiv Can Sustain the Fight against Russia.” AP News. February 24, 2024. https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-2-years-what-to-know-d0f1c1bd57f7ebbe5f7335738acbc6b4.
Matamis, Joaquin. 2024. “Ending the War in Ukraine: Harder than It Seems.” Stimson Center. https://www.stimson.org/2024/ending-the-war-in-ukraine-harder-than-it-seems/.
Mearsheimer, John. “The Darkness Ahead: Where the Ukraine War is Heading”. John Mearsheimer’s Substack, June 23, 2023.“Nataliya Bugayova Explains How Ukraine Can Still Win.” n.d. Hoover Institution. Accessed October 22, 2024. https://www.hoover.org/research/nataliya-bugayova-explains-how-ukraine-can-still-win.
Relations, Council on Foreign. “A Historical Timeline of Post-Independence Ukraine.” PBS, February 22, 2022. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/a-historical-timeline-of-post-independence-ukraine.
Rutland, Peter. “Why Crimea Is the Key to the Ukraine War.” Responsible Statecraft, October 17, 2022. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/10/18/why-crimea-is-the-key-to-the-ukraine-war.
“Slow Counteroffensive Darkens Mood in Ukraine.” The Washington Post, August 13, 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/08/10/ukraine-national-mood-counteroffensive-gloom/.
The Economist. 2024a. “The War Is Going Badly. Ukraine and Its Allies Must Change Course.” Economist (London, England: 1843), September 26, 2024. http://www.economist.com/leaders/2024/09/26/the-war-is-going-badly-ukraine-and-its-allies-must-change-course.
The Economist. 2024b. “Ukraine Is on the Defensive, Militarily, Economically and Diplomatically.” Economist (London, England: 1843), September 26, 2024. http://www.economist.com/briefing/2024/09/26/ukraine-is-on-the-defensive-militarily-economically-and-diplomatically.
The Economist. 2024c. “America’s Presidential Election Marks a Fork in the Road for Ukraine.” Economist (London, England: 1843), October 9, 2024. http://www.economist.com/united-states/2024/10/09/americas-presidential-election-marks-a-fork-in-the-road-for-ukraine.
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“Ukraine Continues Valiant Defense against Russian Invaders.” n.d. U.S. Department of Defense. Accessed October 22, 2024. https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3931856/ukraine-continues-valiant-defense-against-russian-invaders/.
Vakulenko, Sergey. n.d. “Russia Has the Resources for a Long War in Ukraine.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Accessed October 22, 2024. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/03/v-usloviyah-voennogo-bremeni-glavnye-voprosy-o-nastoyashem-i-budushem-rossijskoj-ekonomiki?lang=en¢er=russia-eurasia.
Watling, Jack. 2024. “The War in Ukraine Is Not a Stalemate.” Foreign Affairs (Council on Foreign Relations), January 3, 2024. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/war-ukraine-not-stalemate.